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n everyday conversation 
we refer to people in 
different ways (i.e. ‘Jane’, 
‘the girl’, ‘she’, ‘her’, 
‘herself’, silent pronoun 
(which linguists often call 
an ‘empty category’or ec) without 
giving a moment’s thought 
about how we chop and change 
from one label to another as we 
become more engrossed in our 
conversation:
“I saw Jane yesterday. The 
crazy girl was changing into a 
bright red dress for her interview. 
She asked how it looked and then 
admired herself in the mirror. 
I persuaded her ec to change 
into something a bit more 
conservative, and said that ec 
turning up at the Foreign Office 
in a cocktail dress wasn’t the best 
way of securing that particular 
job.”
Throughout this discourse, 
Jane is referred to in six different 
ways. However, we know that 
it is Jane who is wearing the 
dress, Jane looking in the mirror, 
Jane getting changed and Jane 
potentially turning up at the 
interview. The reason we can be 
so flexible with the terms we use 
to talk about people is because 
most of the time we can safely 
assume that the person we’re 
chatting to can keep track of 
‘who did what to whom’ without 
any difficulty. It’s highly likely 
that they will respond using 
similar language and that this 
tacit understanding between us 
will ensure that we communicate 
successfully.
But there are some people 
who can have real problems 
communicating in this way: 
the intuitive, effortless bridges 
we form to make referential 
links pose challenges which 
can only be overcome through 
A project at the University 
of Kent demonstrates key 
areas of language at which 
individuals with autism excel. 
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grammatical and contextual 
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painstaking effort. Children with 
autistism spectrum disorder 
fall into this category. The 
classic symptoms associated 
with individuals on this 
spectrum are a so-called triad 
of impairments, where, to a 
greater or lesser degree, there are 
issues with social competence, 
communicative ability and 
repetitive behaviour. But the 
word ‘spectrum’ is key. It means 
that there is a great deal of 
variation and that children 
do not conform to some kind 
of prototype. Aside from this 
variation, a frequently neglected 
point is that these children 
have their own characters quite 
independent of their autism 
diagnosis: they are not wholly 
defined by their diagnosis, a 
point we should bear in mind 
when generalising about 
individuals.
Recent linguistic research 
has paid more attention to 
variation in autism. This is 
important because the more we 
distinguish between children 
on this spectrum, the more 
precise profiles we can build of 
their communicative strengths 
and weaknesses. We can then 
incorporate this knowledge 
into intervention programmes 
tailored to meet a particular 
child’s needs. Without this 
precision, we risk producing 
overly broad packages which 
either under – or overestimate 
a child’s linguistic knowledge, 
resulting in redundant, missed or 
delayed language therapy.
Together with my colleague, 
Alex Perovic at University 
College London, I have recently 
uncovered aspects of grammar 
and pragmatics that seem to 
be in sync with that of typically 
developing children. This is 
exciting because most of the 
literature reports on these 
children’s pragmatic weaknesses, 
so finding a strength gives us 
something that can potentially 
be used as a stepping stone 
for more complex pragmatic 
problems. Here is what we did. 
If I read you the sentence 
below and then asked you to pick 
the picture that went best with 
the sentence, which one would 
you pick? 




Yes, the right answer is A! 
Your job in this so-called ‘picture-
selection task’ is to decide who 
can be interpreted as the agent 
of the verb ‘make’. It can never 
be B, in which Joanna is making 
the cake. If I prompted you with 
an extra sentence before the 
critical one, as in ‘Let me tell you 
something about Joanna. Joanna 
persuaded Arthur to make the 
cake’, your answer should still 
be Arthur. Even if I gave you a 
short narrative consisting of two 
sentences before the critical one, 
as in ‘Joanna is having a birthday 
party. Joanna prepares all of the 
party food. Joanna persuaded 
Arthur to make the cake’, you 
should still stick stubbornly to 
Arthur as the purported baker 
of the cake. The reason you do 
this so confidently is because the 
interpretation of this sentence 
is set grammatically: contextual 
cues do not help you to decide 
how to interpret it. Most 
typically developing children get 
this right from about six to seven 
years of age. That is, they ignore 
contextual cues in inappropriate 
circumstances.
We examined children with 
autism between the ages of seven 
and sixteen on these kinds of 
sentences and found them to 
respond no differently to the 
typically developing control 
groups. We focused on a sub-
group, namely high-functioning 
children with autism (these are 
children who score above 80 on 
a non-verbal reasoning measure) 
so that we could pay attention 
to the heterogeneity referred 
to above and then replicated 
this study on a further high-
functioning group and found 
the very same results. This was 
important as these sentences 
had never been tested in autism 
before, so replication allows for 
extra confidence in the findings.
Once we had confirmed 
that the children with autism 
could ignore context when it 
is not vital to interpretation, 
we wanted to see if they did 
pay attention to it when it 
was helpful. This would tell us 
whether the children were able 
to attend to context selectively. 
With this in mind, we presented 
them with sentences whose 
interpretations are discourse-
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led. Using the same paradigm 
as above, children were asked to 
pick the picture that went best 
with sentences like this: 
‘Arthur said to Sally that ec
?
 
pouring the water quickly was a 
mistake.’
This time, both groups’ 
responses differed. Although the 
children chose the picture with 
Sally as the agent of ‘pour’ more 
often, about a third of responses 
had Arthur as the agent. That’s 
because unlike the first example, 
there is no right answer to this 
one. Context decides who the 
agent is and context can change. 
The real test came when we 
inserted the contextual cues 
before the sentences to see if 
their answers would differ from 
the one they had given to the 
baseline question, as in ‘Let 
me tell you something about 
Arthur. Arthur said to Sally that 
pouring the water quickly was 
a mistake’, or ‘Arthur is making 
a stew. Arthur holds the jug 
clumsily. Arthur said to Sally that 
pouring the water quickly was a 
mistake’. Both groups of children 
performed similarly. Children 
without autism were not swayed 
by the weak contextual cue, still 
preferring Sally as the agent of 
‘pour’. However, in the face of 
the strong cue, nearly all of the 
responses shifted in line with the 
referent primed in the narrative, 
namely Arthur. Crucially, our 
children with autism did exactly 
the same.
At this point, we had 
established two things. Firstly, 
high-functioning children with 
autism knew how to ignore a 
contextual cue when it was not 
relevant, and – when given a 
really strong cue – they could 
use it when appropriate. One 
last sentence type was needed 
to show us that they could also 
attend to weak cues in a typical 
way. We used a sentence known 
to be easier for adults and typical 
children to shift pragmatically:
‘ec
?
 Reading the book slowly 
made Charlie sleepy.’
In this last construction only 
one person is mentioned in 
the sentence, namely Charlie. 
The question was whether the 
presence of Joanna as a purely 
visual cue would affect children’s 
responses. Who would they 
interpret as reading the book? 
Well, in the baseline sentence, 
there was variability again. 
Many children chose Charlie 
but the younger the child was, 
the more likely it was that they 
went for Joanna. What was made 
apparent in the contextually-
cued conditions, however, was 
that once again our children with 
autism were performing exactly 
like our typically developing 
children. When presented with 
‘Let me tell you something about 
Joanna. Reading the book slowly 
made Charlie sleepy’, nearly all of 
the children’s responses switched 
to Joanna.
The kind of pragmatic skill 
I’ve outlined above is called 
‘reference resolution’ because 
you have to resolve who is being 
referred to on the basis of the 
amount of context given. It’s 
a lot simpler than many of the 
pragmatic tasks that have been 
examined in children with 
autism, which are often used as 
the basis for the generalisation 
that children with autism have 
deficient pragmatic skills. Take, 
for example, the sentence, 
‘That man is a toad’. In order to 
understand this metaphor, the 
child must first grasp what a toad 
is, which relies on their having 
access to this encyclopaedic 
knowledge. S/he then has 
to reject this encyclopaedic 
knowledge and link attributes 
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prototypically associated with 
toads (e.g. slimy, warty) to 
properties that can be used to 
describe humans (e.g. loathsome, 
vile). Only then can s/he reach 
the conclusion that what is 
intended is that the person is 
being described as horrid. So this 
example of pragmatics requires 
the ability to perform a complex 
sequence of inferences before 
its non-literal interpretation can 
be reached. If we start to break 
down these components though, 
and pay equal attention to the 
smaller inferential steps needed 
to understand pragmatically 
regulated examples of language, 
we might tap into areas that are 
intact and that can be used when 
tackling the more complex cases.
The type of pragmatic skill 
we tested in this study focused 
on the children’s ability to 
reject contextual cues that 
are not helpful and also to use 
contextual cues to establish 
links between referents that 
are. This weighing up of the 
appropriateness of incoming 
information for sentences with 
variable reference is a feat our 
high-functioning children 
with autism proved to excel in, 
and could be a valuable tool to 
exploit when trying to bridge 
the various gaps that exist in 
conversation between what is 
said and what is intended. Our 
project complements other 
studies that are also finding 
encouraging results in children 
and adults with autism which 
look at less complex pragmatic 
inferences, such as those used 
to understand the words ‘or’ 
and ‘some’ in different contexts. 
Having hit upon such a positive 
skill, we intend to pursue ways in 
which this could be put to work 
by children when facing further 
communicative hurdles. ¶
This research was supported by 
the British Academy (SG112896).
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autism knew how to 
ignore a contextual 
cue when it was 
not relevant, and – 
when given a really 
strong cue – they 
could use it when 
appropriate.”
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